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Abstract
This paper adds to the already vast economic literature on the respective role of shocks
and institutions in unemployment dynamics. Conclusions of existing studies widely di-
verge. Such divergences are mainly due to a weak theoretical framework underlying the
models which have been estimated. We have tried to overcome such weaknesses by re-
lying on a structural model based on a Phillips curve in order to obtain a reduced form
unemployment equation. Once estimated, this reduced form accounts for the importance
of macroeconomic shocks in explaining changes in unemployment. The introduction of
institutional variables and the estimation of three potential effects on unemployment (level,
persistence and sensitivity to shocks) lead to results, which are consistent with theoretical
predictions. Nevertheless, the role of institutions in explaining changes in unemployment
is limited. We use a panel data approach by pooling country data in order to disentangle
fixed country effects.
Keywords: Equilibrium unemployment; Structural model; shock; labour market institutions;
OECD; cross-section estimation.
JEL Classification: C13, C31, E24
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1 Introduction
Since the influential work of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), many studies have tried to explain
the differences in the OECD unemployment rate as the result of interaction between shocks and
labour market institutions. Modelling this interaction is viewed as a promising way for under-
standing the puzzle of unemployment disparities which can be explained by none of the two
kinds of variables individually. Indeed, on the one hand, OECD countries have been affected by
symmetric shocks and have nevertheless experienced different unemployment dynamics. On
the other hand, before the 1970s, all these countries had low unemployment rates in spite of
quite different labour market institutions.
Using cross section data, these studies test a direct relationship between the unemployment
rate, shocks and institutions and thus have the advantage of readily allowing for international
comparisons. However, testing a reduced equation of the unemployment rate constitutes also
their main drawback as they do not analyze formally the link between the unemployment rate
and the wage determination process. As a consequence, empirical results are quite divergent
among studies since they often lay on ad hoc specifications that may have little theoretical
foundations.
The present contribution formally deduces a reduced form of the unemployment rate equa-
tion from a wage and price setting structural model. The econometric estimation of this re-
duced form accounts for the importance of macroeconomic shocks in explaining changes in
unemployment. We use a panel data approach by pooling country data in order to disentangle
fixed country effects. The introduction of institutional variables and the estimation of three of
their potential effects on unemployment (on its level, on its persistence and on its sensitivity to
shocks) leads to results which are consistent with theoretical predictions. Nevertheless, the role
of institutions in explaining changes in unemployment is limited and the results are fragile. Par-
ticularly, some endogeneity problems cannot be ruled out, thus reversing the original causality
going from institutions to unemployment.
The present paper highlights the main drawbacks of the methodology which consists in
testing a reduced form of the unemployment rate without analysing formally the link between
the unemployment rate and the wage determination process (Section 2). Section 3 shows how
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the reduced model can be inferred from a wage and price setting structural model where the
wage equation is a Phillips curve. It also defines precisely the concept of shock and institution.
Section 4 simulates a small macroeconomic model and shows how the impact of shocks may de-
pend on labour market institutions. The next two sections display the results of the econometric
estimations. In Section 5, estimations include only shocks variables. Institutions are implic-
itly taken into account via fixed effect on coefficients. Section 6 tests the additional impact of
institutional variables in order (1) to find out if fixed effects variance accross country reflects
differences in institutional characteristics, (2) to apprehend the eventual impact of time-varying
institutions.
2 Empirical literature on shocks and institutions
The empirical literature testing the effect of shocks and institutions on unemployment generally
assumes that the evolution of the unemployment rate depends on economic shocks, on institu-
tional variables and on the past unemployment rate (U ):
Ut = f(shocks, institutions, Ut−1) (1)
One of the first estimations of such a relation is to be found in the seminal work of Layard et
al. (1991, p. 55). Based on a panel of 20 OECD countries, their work does not take macroeco-
nomic shocks into account. Their estimated equation is only a function of institutional variables
as follows:
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Average unemployment rate (%) = 0.24 + 0.92 Duration of unemployment benefit (years)
(1983-88) + 0.17 Replacement rate (%)
- 0.13 Active employment policies (%)
+ 2.45 Coverage of collective agreements (1-3)
- 1.42 Labour unions coordination (1-3)
- 4.24 Employers coordination (1-3)
- 0.35 Change in the inflation rate (%)
The value of the centred R2 shows that more than 90% of the differences in the average
unemployment rate during the 1983-88 period is explained by six institutional characteristics
of the labour market. All coefficients are significant and have the sign expected by theoretical
wage bargaining models. Labour unions strength as well as the level and the duration of un-
employment benefits have a negative impact on employment, while the degree of coordination
between social partners has a positive impact (Soskice, 1990).
This result, which attributes an important role to labour market institutions as a determinant
of unemployment, is nonetheless obtained on data referring to a rather limited time period. Fur-
ther work on international comparisons was not able to establish an automatic and robust link
between economic performance and wage bargaining systems1. For instance, the OECD (1997)
attempts to find some econometric relationships between certain institutional variables and eco-
nomic performance indicators such as the employment and unemployment rates, inflation and
wage inequalities. This study constructs several indicators of the collective bargaining systems
for 19 Member countries, such as the bargaining coordination, trade union density and cover-
age. As no relation of the " reversed-U " type2 appears, the authors conclude to a " negative "
result.
Even if results were more " positive " according to the neo-classical view as previous work
were, one can still cast some doubts on their robustness since some of the main causes of
the unemployment hike, i.e. macroeconomic shocks, are disregarded. The purely institutional
1For an empirical literature review see OECD (1997) or Cadiou et al. (1999).
2Some models of wage bargaining predict a "reversed-U " type relationship between the equilibrium rate of
unemployment and the level of wage negotiation (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
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approach neglects the fact that, before the 1970s shocks, all the OECD economies had a low
unemployment rate, despite showing an already wide diversity in labour market institutions. By
overlooking the role of shocks, the study implicitly assumes that all OECD economies have been
affected by the same shock. In order to overcome this critique, various studies have estimated an
unemployment equation including some shocks. Among the earliest studies, the one by Layard
et al. (1991, table 12, p. 433) takes into account restrictive monetary policies and increases in
import prices. But this methodology became popular in the economic literature mainly after the
seminal paper of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
The main advantage of this approach is to propose a coherent empirical framework which
is able to test the interaction between shocks and institutions in an international comparison.
However, it presents the major shortcoming of obtaining results which are largely dependent
on the specification of the model. As a matter of fact, the different studies end up to quite
diverging conclusions as to the respective role of institutions and shocks in the determination
of the unemployment dynamic. The conclusions of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) are quite
balanced. They explain the rise in unemployment in Europe by the interaction between labour
market institutions (mainly the tax wedge on labour and the unemployment benefit replacement
rate) and shocks (the slowdown in labour productivity as well as the rise in real interest rates, in
oil prices and in the share of value added going to profit). According to their results, changes in
institutions did not have any impact. Nickell et al. (2005), however, explain 55% of the rise in
the European unemployment rate by shifts in labour market institutions and claim that shocks
do not have a significant impact when institutions are introduced. On the contrary, Fitoussi et
al. (2000) or Palley (2001) find a minor impact of institutions3.
Moreover, the impact of a particular variable varies among studies. According to Belot
and van Our (2004) or Baccaro and Rei (2005), the tax wedge does not explain differences in
OECD employment performance, whereas it has a negative significant impact on unemployment
3Nickell et al. (2005) conclude : " [. . . ] broad movements in unemployment across the OECD can be explained
by shifts in labour market institutions [...] ". In Fitoussi et al. (2000), the conclusion is radically the opposite: " We
[...] showed that the labour market reforms advocated by the OECD Secretariat, while helpful in some cases, leave
us far short of explaining which countries recovered in the 1990’s and by how far ". The tone is similar in Palley
(2001) : " The conventional wisdom is that the cause of high European unemployment lies in a job market that is
rigid and inflexible. [...] The empirical results reported in this paper directly challenge this received wisdom. [...]
The evidence clearly shows that macroeconomic factors matter for unemployment [...] ".
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in IMF (2003) or Bassanini and Duval (2005). While the replacement ratio is insignificant in
Baccaro and Rei (2005), it has a negative impact on unemployement in Belot and van Our
(2004), but a positive one in Bassanini and Duval (2005).
These differences in diagnosis do not come from different datasets on institutional variables
since most studies retained those used by Nickell (1997) for the estimation of the previous equa-
tion on recent data (see Table 1, column 3). These discrepancies bear two main explanations.
The first one concerns the shocks taken into consideration and the way they are modelled. The
second column in Table 1 shows substantial differences in the way the impact of shocks is speci-
fied. For example, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use the growth rate in total factor productivity
while Nickell et al. (2005) use the change in this growth rate or the cyclical component of pro-
ductivity. Therefore, the same productivity shock will bear a permanent effect in the first study,
but a mere transitory one in the second one. The second explication comes from the different
specification retained in modelling the interaction between shocks and institutions. In Palley
(2001) or Karanassou et al. (2003), shocks and institutions interact in an additive form (Equa-
tion (1.4) in Table 1), while in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Layard et al. (1991) or Fitoussi et
al. (2000)4, they interact in a multiplicative form (Equation (1.1) to (1.3)). Whereas the additive
form states independence between the impacts of institutions and shocks on unemployment, the
multiplicative form conveys interdependence. Moreover, the impact of the past unemployment
rate is modelled either linearly (Equations (1.3) to (1.5)) or as a product of institutions (Equation
(1.1)). Some studies, such as Layard et al. (1991), Nickell (1998) or Nickell et al. (2005), also
test interactions among institutions themselfs. Algebraically, it is expressed as the product of
different institutions5 (Equations (1.1) and (1.5)). All these different specifications are special
cases of the following equation for the unemployment rate:
Ut = (I + S + Ut−1) + (IS ′ + II ′ + IU ′t−1 + SS
′ + SU ′t−1 + Ut−1U
′
t−1) (2)
4See also Bertola et al. (2001) who enrich the model of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) with additional institu-
tional variables: wage and population distribution, unemployment and labour force by age and gender.
5Belot and Van Ours (2001 and 2004) study 18 de OECDMember countries over the 1960-1995 period and use
a similar specification to test interactions between shocks and institutions. According to these authors, the higher
the replacement ratio, the more negative the effect of the tax wedge on unemployment. However, one can cast
serious doubts on the robustness of this result since no shock is included in their model.
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Where S, I and U are respectively the matrixes of shocks, institutions and unemployment
rates. X ′ is the transposed matrix of X .
The specification of the estimated model, which strongly influences the empirical results,
generally suffers from a lack of theoritical foundation6. It appears to be more motivated by
authors’ beliefs concerning the degree of persistence of shocks and the respective influence
of shocks and institutions rather than by real theoretical arguments. As a consequence, this
methodology is quite silent as far as the transmission channels of shocks, their degree of persis-
tence or the endogeneity (or exogeneity) of institutions are concerned.
This may lead to serious misintepretations of economic causal relations: the rise in un-
employment would explain the increase in an institutional variable rather than the opposite7.
Typically, the rise in the unemployment benefit replacement rate or in labour taxes is likely to
be the consequence for, rather than the cause of, the rise in unemployment.
Finally, the estimated model is often difficult to interpret. This is clearly not a structural
unemployment rate equation since none of its determinants (employment and the labour force)
are modelled. The presence of inflationary shocks such as oil prices combined with the change
in inflation (Fitoussi et al., 2000; Palley, 2001) or the change in the stock of money (Nickell
et al., 1991, 2005) suggests that we are dealing with the concept of NAIRU (Non Accelerating
Inflation Rate of Unemployement). But this is not the case in all studies: in Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000), the change in inflation is not taken into account. The analysis of the underlying
structural model may help to overcome these weaknesses.
6Layard et al. (1991) is one of the rare authors providing theoretical justification by deriving the reduced
unemployment equation from a wage and price structural model.
7In their conclusion, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) acknowledge this weakness: " We worry about the endo-
geneity of labour market institutions ".
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Table 1 : Some reduced approach specifications of interactions between shocks and institutions.
Articles/specification Shocks Institutions
Layard et al. (1991)
(1.1) Uit = I1Uit−1 + (1− I1)I2(I3t + C1t + I4C2t)
• Replacement ratio is the only institution
varying with time.
• Period : 1956− 1988 / 19 OECD countries.
Variations of imported prices (1+),
and of the stock of money (2-).
Unemployment benefit duration (1+, 2+),
Coordination ok wage negotiation (1-, 2-),
Labour force turnover rate (1-),
Replacement ratio (3+),
Dummy for wage pressure since 1970 (3+),
Duration of labour contracts (4-),
Degree of indexation and synchronisation of labour
contracts (4-).
Blanchard and wolfers (2000)
(1.2) Uit = Ct(1 + I)
• The introduction of institution variations gives
unsatisfactory results.
• Period : 1960− 1995 / 20 OECD countries.
Trend growth rate of total factor productivity (-),
Real interest rate (+),
Share of value added going to labour (+).
Replacement ratio (3+),
Unemployment protection (+),
Labour market active policies (-),
Unemployment protection (+),
Tax rate (+),
Union coverage (+),
Union density (+),
Coordination index (-).
Fitoussi et al. (2000)
(1.3) Uit = λiUit−1 + I1 + I2C1t + C2t
• Stable institution (mean for the period
1983-88).
• Period : 1960− 1998.
Trend growth rate of labour productivity (1-),
World real interest rate (+),
Variation of inflation (-),
Social transfers (1+),
Inflation (2-).
Replacement ratio (1+),
Duration of unemployment benefit (2+),
Union coverage (1+,2+),
Union density (1+,2+),
Coordination index (1-,2-).
Paley(2001)
(1.4) Uit = λiUit−1 + It + Ct
• Variation of institutions : 2 means (1983-88
and 1989-94).
• Period : 1979− 1998 / 20 OECD countries.
Variation of inflation (-),
Real interest rate (+),
GDP growth rate (-).
Idem Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
Trade openess ratio (-).
Nickell et al. (2005)
(1.5) Uit = λiUit−1 + It + ItI ′t + Ct
• Time-varying institutions.
• Period : 1962− 1995 / 20 OECD countries.
Labour demand (-),
Second difference of money stock (-)
and of the logarithm of total factor productivity (-),
Gap between this productivity and its trend (-),
Variation of real import prices (+).
Replacement ratio (+),
Unemployment benefit duration (+),
Unemployment protection (+),
Tax rate (+),
Union density (+),
Union coverage (-).
Key : C and I are respectively matrix of shock and institution, Uit the unemployment rate of country i; (i+) : the shock (respectively the institution) has a positive impact on Ci (respectively Ii).
3 A structural model of wage-price setting
Since the formalisation of Wage Setting / Price Setting (WS/PS) models by Layard et al. (1991),
the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment (ERU) has been defined as the unemployment rate that
equalises the real wage asked by workers (WS curve) with the one employers are able to pay
considering their price setting behaviour (PS curve). The ERU is equivalent to the concept
of the NAIRU formalised by Phelps (1967, 1968) since inflation stability implies adequacy
between the WS and the PS curve. Several specifications of the structural model are possible.
In particular, the advocates of the Phillips curve and the supporters of the WS curve in level
(Layard et al., 1991; Blanchard and Katz, 1999; Chagny et al., 2002) disagree. We chose
a Phillips curve based on previous findings (Heyer, Reynès and Sterdyniak, 2007 ; Reynès,
2006). Firstly, the Phillips curve is a more general model since traditional WS curves in level
correspond to the limit case of a Phillips curve with full hysteresis. Secondly, the Phillips
curve appears to have more realistic foundations since it does not entail arbitrary hypotheses
concerning the reservation wage of workers. A general specification of the Phillips curve is:
W˙t = Ψ+ αP˙
C
t−1 + β ∗ Ut − β′∆Ut + δP˙RODt − γ(P˙Ct − P˙ Vt )− θT˙Ct + ζT˙ It (3)
Where W is wage, PC the consumer price index, U the unemployment rate, PROD labour
productivity, P V the price of value-added, TC the employer social contribution rate, T I the
direct and indirect tax rate8.
This relation embodies a large set of wage setting mecanisms such as collective bargaining
between employers and trade unions or individual bargaining between the employer and each
worker. Equation (3) implies nonetheless that employees and employers agree on indexing
wages to some key variables which may be object for negotiation. These variables are mainly
inflation, productivity gains, terms of trade (P˙Ct − P˙ Vt ) and the tax wedge. The level and delay
of indexation may vary accross country.
Compared to the traditional WS curve à la Layard et al. (1991), this general specification
8The lower-case variables are in logarithm. t is the time operator. Variables in first difference and in growth rate
are respectively referred to as ∆Xt = Xt −Xt−1 and X˙t = Xt/Xt−1 − 1 ≈ ∆xt. All coefficients are positive
and long-run, ignoring adjustment lags for algebraic simplicity.
10
of the Phillips curve presents the advantage that it does not require a unit indexation of wages
on prices and labour productivity to be postulated a priori. Hence, it represents the result of
wage bargaining, where employees are not always able to obtain the automatic indexation of
their wages on prices and where the reference to labour productivity growth is not necessarily
made.
Whereas the unit indexation of wages on prices is generally motivated by the absence of
nominal illusion of workers and firms, several theoretical arguments go against this proposition
of full indexation. As wages are not continuously negotiated, the real wage may decrease with
inflation. When inflation is low, workers may not perceive the decrease of their purchasing
power (Akerlof et al., 2000). But they may not be able to maintain their purchasing power in
periods of sustained inflation either, since their bargaining power may be weakened especially
if the labour market situation is not favourable (e.g. Tobin, 1972). In some countries, trade
unions may contribute to the reduction in inflation if they are concerned by macroeconomic
performances (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990) or if they fear the reaction of the
Central bank. Then, unions may also agree to take into account the evolution of labour produc-
tivity in order to limit the negative impact of a productivity slowdown (δ > 0). However, this
is not always the case since labour productivity growth is a macroeconomic concept which has
no meaning at the firm level. If trade unions are concerned by the competitiveness of their firm,
they may accept wage losses in case of a deterioration of the terms of trade due for instance to
an oil shock (γ > 0) or of a rise in the employer’s social contribution (θ > 0). On the contrary,
they may want to maintain their purchasing power and ask for wage hikes after an increase in
their social contribution rate(ζ > 0).
Ψ is a coefficient representative of wage-push factors that may vary with the bargaining
power of workers and may then depend positively on the trade union membership or the unem-
ployment benefit replacement rate. Finally, changes in the unemployment rate may influence the
Phillips curve because wages can be affected not only by the level but also by the change in em-
ployment (Phillips, 1958; Lipsey, 1960) or by hysteresis phenomena9. It is generally regarded
as full hysteresis when only changes in the unemployment rate influence the wage setting (e.g.
9Hysteresis occurs when the long-term unemployed exert no influence on wage-setting (Blanchard and Sum-
mers, 1986; Lindbeck, 1993). However, some authors contest the use of the term hysteresis to describe this
phenomenon (Cross, 1995).
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Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Full hysteresis is often detected in the United Kingdom (e.g.
Chagny et al., 2002).
Consumer prices are a function of the import price (PM ) and the price of value-added :
P˙Ct = ηP˙
M
t + (1− η)P˙ Vt (4)
The price-of-value-added-setting results from profit maximisation in an imperfect competitive
market. Firms set their price as a mark-up (M ) over unit labour costs. Assuming no adjustment
lag for algebraic simplicity, the growth rate of the price of value-added is:
P˙ Vt = W˙t + T˙
C
t − P˙RODt + M˙t (5)
mt = ξ + ξ
′TCUt + ξ
′′IRt (6)
The mark-up may depend on the tensions in the labour market, i.e. on the production capacity-
utilisation ratio (TCU ): it may also depend on real interest rates (IR) if firms take their capital
cost into account in their price setting process. Combining Equations (3), (4), (5), (6) leads
to the following reduced Phillips curve, where a rise in inflation depends on permanent and
transitory shocks (ZLT etZMT ):
∆P˙Ct = Z
LT
t + Z
MT
t − βUt − β′∆Ut (7)
ZLTt = Ψ− (1− α)P˙Ct−1 − (1− δ)P˙RODt (8)
ZMTt = M˙t + (1− θ)T˙Ct + [η/((1− η)(1− γ))](P˙Mt − P˙Ct ) + ζT˙ It (9)
From Equation (7), it is possible to infer the ERU, defined as the unemployment rate stabilis-
ing inflation (∆P˙Ct = 0). The long-term ERU (ERULT , U
LT ) is the unemployment rate that
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stabilises inflation in the long run and depends only on permanent shocks:
ULTt = [Ψ− (1− α)P˙Ct−1 − (1− δ)P˙RODt ]/β (10)
It depends on inflation and labour productivity if there is a non-unit indexation of wages on
prices and labour productivity. In the case of inflation, an inflation-unemployment dilemma
remains in the long run. The medium-term ERU (ERUMT , UMT ) stabilises inflation in the
medium run and thus takes also into account temporary shocks:
UMTt = [β
′/(β + β′)]Ut−1 + (ZLTt + Z
MT
t )/(β + β
′) (11)
Integrating Equation (11) into (7) allows to express changes in inflation as a function of the gap
between the unemployment rate and the ERUMT :
∆P˙Ct = −(β + β′)(Ut − UMTt ) (12)
Inverting this equation allows for expressing the unemployment rate as a function of its past
level and of inflationary shocks:
Ut = φ0Ut−1 + φ1 + φ2P˙Ct−1 + φ3P˙
ROD
t + φ4∆T
CU
t + φ5∆I
R
t
+φ6T˙
C
t + φ7(P˙
M
t − P˙Ct ) + φ8T˙ It + φ9∆P˙Ct (13)
With φ0 = β′/(β+β′), φ1 = (1−φ0)ψ/β, φ2 = −(1−φ0)(1−α)/β, φ3 = −(1−φ0)(1−δ)/β,
φ4 = ξ
′/(β + β′), φ5 = ξ′′/(β + β′), φ6 = (1− θ)/(β + β′), φ7 = η/(1− η)(1− γ)/(β + β′),
φ8 = ζ/(β + β
′), φ9 = −1/(β + β′).
According to this structural model, the unemployment rate depends not only on shocks
but also on institutional characteristics of the wage-price setting embodied in the value of the
parameter φi. The higher φ0, i.e. the higher is the hysteresis (β′), the more persistent the
unemployment rate. The higher φ1, i.e. the higher is the wage push factor (ψ), the higher
the unemployment rate. The response to shock may also depend on the characteristics of the
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wage setting process. The lower φ3, i.e. the closer to unity the indexation of wage on labour
productivity (δ), the lower the increase in the unemployment rate after a productivity slowdown.
A similar reasoning holds for other shocks: deterioration of the term of trade, increase in the
employer’s social contribution, etc.
As a consequence, the parameters of the model express nothing else but labour market in-
stitutions. Their value may vary across countries because of differences in wage-price setting
mecanisms. This statement can be evaluated by testing fixed effect on these coefficients with
cross-section econometrics techniques (Section 5). It is also possible to test if differences ac-
cross countries can be explained by differences in institutional variables such as the trade union
membership, the unemployment benefit replacement rate, the minimum wage level, the degree
of mismatch, the tax wedge, the degree of competitiveness, etc (Section 6). In addition, test-
ing the impact of these institutional variables allows us to evaluate the effect of time-varying
institutions on the unemployment dynamics.
In case of full hysteresis (β = 0), the unemployment rate data has a unit root: φ0 = 1
and the model does not provide a consistent equilibrium growth path anymore: a permanent
increase or decrease in the unemployment rate is necessary for inflation stability (Equation
(13)). As in the WS curve à la Layard et al. (1991), only a unit indexation of wages on prices
and productivity (α = δ = 1) and a coefficient ψ = 0 are consistent with a stable equilibrium
growth path. Because of the full hysteresis hypothesis, an increase in the social contribution rate
or any shock increasing the desired mark-up of workers and firms (such as increases in the real
interest rate or in the capacity-utilisation ratio) would permanently raise the unemployement
rate. With a Phillips curve (without full hysteresis), a slowdown in labour productivity or a fall
in inflation would raise permanently the ERULT but increases in the social contribution rate or
in the desired mark-up of firms (following an increase in the interests rate or in the capacity-
utilisation ratio) would only have a transitory effect on the medium-term ERU. For more details
see Reynès (2006, chap. 3).
14
4 Simulating shock under different institutions
Using a simple macroeconomic model, this section simulates the impact of an inflationary shock
on the unemployment dynamic under different labour market institutions. The cases of par-
tial and full hysteresis are successively treated. The previous wage and price structural model
(Equations (3) to (6)) is completed with four additional equations. As population is assumed
stable, the unemployment rate can be expressed as a linear function of the logarithm of em-
ployment (N ) (Equation (14)). Assuming a constant returns to scale production function with
complementary factors (Leontief’s function), employment behaves as the gap between demand
(Y ) and productivity trend (Equation (15)). Aggregate demand, which includes private demand
and public outlays, depends positively on the expected production level (past production aug-
mented by productivity gains) and on the public budget deficit (D) and negatively on the real
interest rate (Equation (16)). Monetary policy is described by a reaction function à la Taylor
(1993). The Central bank fixes the nominal interest rate (IN ) as a function of the gap between
the effective and the target inflation and of the output gap (Equation (17)).
Ut = −nt (14)
nt = yt − P˙RODt t (15)
yt = yt−1 + P˙RODt − σ(INt − P˙Ct ) +Dt (16)
INt = I
N∗
t + (P˙
C
t − P˙C∗t ) + λ(yt − P˙RODt t) (17)
Where IN∗t and P˙
C∗
t are respectively the nominal interest rate and the inflation targets.
The reference scenario is one where all variables, including productivity gains, and all con-
stant terms are set equal to 0. The values of the parameters are set as follows:
• for partial hysteresis : β = 0.25 and β′ = 0.25
• for full hysteresis : β = 0 and β′ = 0.25
• σ = 2
• unit-indexation of wages on prices : α = 1
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• no indexation of wages on the terms of trade (γ = 0), on the employer’s social contribu-
tion rate (θ = 0) and on productivity (δ = 0)
• the import share in consumption is : η = 0.25
• the monetary authority attributes the same importance to the objectives of price and of
output stability and :  = 0.5 and λ = 0.5
4.1 The case of partial hysteresis
4.1.1 Impact of a permanent demand shock (a budget deficit increase)
With a unit indexation of wages on consumer prices an expansionary fiscal policy entailing
a permanent increase in the budget deficit leads to a temporary fall in unemployment. The
monetary authority reacts to the fall in unemployment and to the subsequent increase in in-
flation by raising the nominal interest rate. The higher interest rate, by its depressing effect
on investment reduces aggregate demand and boosts unemployment. In the long term, the un-
employment rate reaches its initial level and the fiscal multiplier is equal to 0. Only with a
partial indexation of wages on prices (α < 1), the fiscal multiplier is positive as implied by the
inflation-unemployment dilemma.
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Key: in pourcentage; Dt = 1
4.1.2 Impact of a temporary supply shock (increase in import prices or in the employer’s
social contribution rate)
An inflationary shock, such as an increase in import prices leads to a temporary increase in
the unemployment rate, as the immediate reaction of the monetary authority to higher infla-
tion crowds out investment with a negative impact on aggregate demand and employment. In
presence of a high degree of coordination between workers, unions and the Central bank the
desired level of inflation can be attained by the common action of the monetary authority and
of negotiation among social partners. If workers are willing to accept wage losses by a total
or partial indexation of wages on the terms of trade (γ = 0.5), the higher imported inflation
will not be entirely transferred onto wages and onto the prices of value-added, thus reducing the
inflationary impact of the initial shock. In this less inflationary environment, the response of
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the monetary authority will be less restrictive and the rise in the unemployment rate of a lower
extent.
In the case of an increase in the employer’s social contribution rate, the results are quali-
tatively the same as in the case of an increase in input prices or in the mark-up, whether in a
non-cooperative environment (θ = 0) or in a cooperative one (θ = 0.5).
Key: in pourcentage; P˙Mt = 1
4.1.3 Impact of a permanent supply shock (slowdown in the productivity trend)
A permanent supply shock such as a slowdown in the trend of technical progress provokes a
permanent drift of inflation which is counteracted by a rise in the nominal interest rate. By
curbing activity and increasing the unemployment rate to its new non-inflationary level, the
Central bank stabilises the inflation rate to a higher level. In a cooperative environment, where
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wages adjust to lower productivity (δ = 0.5), the new equilibrium unemployment rate will be
lower as the hike in inflation is offset by wage losses and by a lower interest rate increase. This
new equilibrium is compatible with a lower inflation than in a non-cooperative setting (δ = 0).
Key: in pourcentage; P˙RODt = −1
4.2 The case of full hysteresis (β = 0)
A permanent supply shock in the presence of full hysteresis leads to premanent drifts of infla-
tion and of the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Curbing activity and raising unemployment
by a restrictive monetary policy does not lead to a new non-inflationary equilibrium. As previ-
uosly discussed, only full indexation of wages on productivity (δ = 1) allows for a consistent
equilibrium path. Thus, in the following we focus only on shocks allowing for the existence of
a non-explosive long term growth path.
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4.2.1 Impact of a permanent demand shock (a budget deficit increase)
The case of an expansionary fiscal policy entailing a permanent increase in the budget deficit
leads to a permanently lower unemployment rate in the case of full hysteresis. The initial fall
in unemployment is higher since it is counteracted by a less restrictive monetary response than
in the case of partial hysteresis. As inflation depends only on the change in the unemployment
rate, and not on its level, the rise in inflation is lower.
Key: in pourcentage; Dt = 1
4.2.2 Impact of a temporary supply shock (increase in import prices or in the employer’s
social contribution rate)
With full hysteresis, the effect of a temporary supply shock is the same as that of a perma-
nent one with partial hysteresis. The initial shock on the cost of inputs leads to an increase
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in inflation causing an immediate response of the monetary authority and thus to a rise in un-
employment. However, once the unemployment rate has reached its peak, the adjustment of
the unemployment rate to its equilibrium level is indefinitely slow, thus transforming the initial
temporary shock into a permanent one. The higher unemployment rate is combined to a more
inflationary environment. If workers accept to lower their wages in order to counteract the im-
ported inflation shock, then the response of the monetary authority will be less restrictive. The
new equilibrium will be one with lower unemployment and inflation rates than in the case of
absence of cooperation between workers and monetary authorities.
Key: in pourcentage; P˙Mt = 1
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5 Estimating the theoretical model
5.1 The benchmark model
We use OECD data over the 1960-2006 period (see the data Appendix A). Missing values
actually reduce our estimation sample to the 1962-2005 period. Using panel data, we have first
estimated the following benchmark model (Table 2), where unemployment depends on its past
level, on changes in inflation, on the terms of trade P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1, on productivity growth and
on the real interest rate10:
Ui,t = αi + λUi,t−1 + ϕ0(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕ1(P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕ2P˙RODi,t−1 + ϕ3IRi,t−1 + i,t (18)
Specific characteristics of each country are taken into account with fixed effects on the
intercept αi. All independent variables are lagged for two reasons. Firstly, the negative impact
of a shock on unemployment is likely to be delayed. Secondly, from an econometric point
of view, a lagged specification avoids the endogeneity bias. Besides differences in lags, our
estimated specification is quite similar to the unemployment equation (13) derived from our
theoretical model. Few differences must however be mentioned. Some of the variables of the
theoretical model are not reported in our estimation because they did not have a significant
impact: the capacity utilisation ratio, the employer social contribution rate or the tax rate. The
fact that only the first difference of inflation is significant suggests the absence of a long run
unemployment inflation dilemma.
The interest rate in first difference (as suggested in the theoretical model) is not significant
either. But its level is (Table 2), as it is often the case in the literature (see Table 1: Blanchard
and Wolfer, 2000; Fitoussi et al., 2000; Palley, 2001). This discrepancy with our simple the-
oretical model may have several sources. Firstly, the way firms take into account their capital
costs in their price setting process may be quite different from the way usually assumed in stan-
dard theoretical models. The mark-up Equation (6) implicitly assume that the cost of capital
equals the real interest rate. Alternatively, the cost of capital may be seen as a stream of inter-
10All the econometric estimations were performed with the E-views 5.1 program. Programs and data are avail-
able upon requests.
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ests corrected from output growth:
∑t
i=0 (I
R
i − Y˙i). This specification states the intertemporal
constraint of firms. In the long run, the stream of interests paid by firms has to be lower than
their sales. In order to be profitable, firms must increase their price as long as the real interest
rate is above their output growth. With this capital cost specification, the interest rate intervenes
in level, rather than in first difference, in the price equation (5) and hence in the unemployment
equation (13).
Secondly, interest rates affect the economy not only via the price setting. Amongst other
possible channels of transmission are labour capital substitution, output growth via the effect on
investment and consumption. With a more complex theoretical model, we could find a reduced
equation where the unemployment rate is a fonction of the level of the interest rate. But this
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2 : Estimation of Ui,t
Number of observations : 784 R2 : 0.961
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat P-Value
Intercept α¯ 0.088 0.108 0.8 0.417
Ui,t−1 λ 0.910 0.009 93.87 0.000
P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1 ϕ0 -0.048 0.014 -3.53 0.000
P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1 ϕ1 0.007 0.004 1.66 0.098
P˙RODi,t−1 ϕ2 -0.101 0.016 -6.38 0.000
IRi,t−1 ϕ3 0.088 0.009 9.41 0.000
With an adjusted R2 equal to 0.961, the estimation of the benchmark model (18) is quite
satisfactory since inflationary shocks give a good explanation of OECD unemployment. Re-
sults are consistent with economic theory. Policies aimed at curbing inflation (ϕ0) increase
unemployement as predicted by the absence of a long run unemployment/inflation dilemma.
Oil price shocks, accounted for via the import prices (ϕ1), explain part of the increase in OECD
unemployment. Labour productivity growth is significant with a negative sign (ϕ2). This re-
flect the increase in OECD unemployment caused by the productivity slowdown shock which
occured mainly in the 1980s. The increase in interest rates, by discouraging investment has a
recessive effect on activity and thus on employment (ϕ3). Other shocks, often mentionned in
23
the literature (the rise in public finance deficit, in stock market prices and in the share of value
added going to profit) were also tested but they were not significant. Finally, the coefficient
of the lagged unemployment variable is high (λ = 0.91) suggesting the presence of hysteresis.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis of full hysteresis (λ = 1) is rejected by the Wald test. This result is
at odds with most of the unit root tests which generally conclude to the non-stationarity of the
unemployment series11. Nevertheless, we chose to keep the unemployment rate in level because
we want to test heterogeneity in its persistence.
5.2 Fixed effects as institutional discrepancies
The estimation of the benchmark model presents the advantage of showing a clear link between
shocks and unemployment dynamics. However, heterogeneity between countries is only taken
into account with a fixed effect on the intercept. The sensitivity of unemployment to shocks and
its persistence are implicitly assumed homogenious accross OECD countries. This hypothesis
may not be verified, since estimated parameters reflect institutional characteristics (Section 2)
which differ accross OECD countries.
We now check this hypothesis of homogeneity by testing fixed effect for the sensitivity (θi)
and persistence coefficients (λi). In order to simplify the analysis and the description of results,
the model has been constrained by constructing a shock variable:
Ui,t = αi + λiUi,t−1 + θiShocksi,t−1 + εi,t (19)
Where Shocksi,t−1 =
ϕˆ0
ϕˆ3
(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕˆ1ϕˆ3 (P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) +
ϕˆ2
ϕˆ3
P˙RODi,t−1 + I
R
i,t−1.
The shock variable is constructed by using empirical estimators of the benchmark model:
ϕˆ0, ϕˆ1, ϕˆ2 and ϕˆ3 from Table 1. The arbitrary normalisation through ϕˆ3 does not change
econometric results but makes their interpretation easier.
We then estimate the three parameters of equation (19). This two-stages procedure of es-
timation has the advantage of simplicity, but it may lead to biased value for coefficients and
11Only the test of Levin, Lin and Chu rejects the unit root hypothesis.
24
standard errors. We control this bias by comparing the results with the one-stage procedure
estimation of simultaneous equations . The bias is generally small either for the coefficients and
the standard errors (see Appendix B).
We first estimated individual coefficients without constraints. This is equivalent to an OLS
estimation country by country. As this test gave disappointing result, we imposed some con-
straints: the three models test fixed individual effects on the intercept αi; the second model
tests, in addition, fixed effet on the unemployment persistence λi, but the sensibility to shocks
θi is common accross countries, whereas the third model retains the opposite specification.
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Table 3 : Individual coefficients
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pays αi λ∗∗∗i θi
Australia 0.038 0.82 0.121∗∗∗
Austria -0.027 0.97 0.051
Belgium 0.306∗∗ 0.89 0.129∗∗∗
Canada 0.140 0.84 0.155∗∗∗
Denmark -0.210 0.88 0.060∗∗∗
Finland 0.273∗∗ 0.94 0.210∗∗∗
France 0.343∗∗ 0.94 0.085∗∗
Germany 0.285∗ 0.95 0.170∗∗∗
Ireland 0.350∗∗ 0.94 0.187∗∗∗
Italy 0.045 0.87 0.040∗∗
Japan 0.151 0.80 0.022
Netherland 0.136 0.89 0.120∗∗∗
New-Zealand -0.180 0.91 0.089∗∗∗
Norway -0.107 0.92 0.058∗∗
Portugal 0.538∗∗∗ 0.60 0.015
Spain 0.709∗∗∗ 0.92 0.226∗∗∗
Sweden -0.113 0.98 0.040
Switzerland -0.005 0.94 0.123∗∗∗
United Kingdom 0.067 0.88 0.165∗∗∗
United States -0.030 0.69 0.127∗∗∗
Mean 0.085 0.89 0.109
Std err. 0.17 0.06 0.03
αi std err. 0.17 0.34 0.21
(∗∗∗) : significant at 1%, (∗∗) 5%, (∗) 10%
Unemployment persistence varies signicantly accross countries (Table 3). Most of the coun-
tries are close to full hysteresis (λi > 0.9): Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, New-
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Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. A second group of countries presents an
intermediate level of hysteresis (0.8 < λi < 0.9): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands and the United-Kingdom. Only Portugal (0.60) and the United States
(0.69) show a low level of hysteresis.
There is also some heterogeneity in the sensibility of unemployment to shocks. The group
of countries displaying high sensitivity (θi ≈ 0.2) is composed by Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Spain and the United-Kingdom. On the contrary, sensitity is low and/or not significantly dif-
ferent from 0 in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The remaining
countries are in an intermediate position (θi ≈ 0.1): Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Switzerland and the United States.
The introduction of fixed effect for the persistence and the sensitivity of unemployment to
shocks increases the αi standard error from 0.17 to 0.34 and 0.21 respectively(see last line of
Table 3) and hence improve the explanation of the unemployment level. The unexplained part
(αi) tends to be more specific to each country.
This heterogeneity accross countries is confirmed by the Fisher test, sometimes called Hsiao
(1986) test as we used panel data. The test rejects the null hypothesis of equality between
coefficients (Table 4).
Table 4 : Fisher tests
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fisher Statistic 2.87 1.42 6.13
Pvalue 0.000 0.069 0.000
6 Introducing institutional variables
As suggested by our theoretical model (Section 2), this heterogeneity in coefficients is likely
to reflect institutional heterogeneity amongs OECD members. The next step is to test if these
differences can be explained by labour instutitutions data such as trade union membership, un-
employment replacement ratio, tax wedge, etc. In other words, we found out that there were less
hysteresis in certains countries or less sensitivity to shocks in others, but we would like to know
why and if institutions provide a satisfactory explanation to such results. Moreover, the previous
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fixed effect approach implicitly assumes stable institutions over time in a given country. Im-
portant labour market reforms in certain countries may challenge this hypothesis. Incorporating
institutional variables may thus help us take into account time variation in institutions.
In order to do so, Equation (19) is amended as to incorporate institutional variables (Inst):
Ui,t = (α0 + α1Inst) + (λ0 + λ1Inst)Ui,t−1 + (θ0 + θ1Inst)Shocksi,t−1 + εi,t (20)
As suggested by our theoritical model, institutional variables may explain differences in the
intercept (which reflect wage push factors), in persistence and in the sensitivity to shocks. The
model remains linear and the least square estimator can easily be applied since the estimation
consists in incorporating in Equation (19) a few extra independent variables: Inst, Inst∗Ui,t−1
and Inst ∗ Shocksi,t−1 . Constraints on shocks are abandoned when shocks are not coupled with
institutions :
Ui,t = (α0,i + α1Inst) + (λ0 + λ1Inst)Ui,t−1 + ϕ0(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1)
+ ϕ1(P˙
M
i,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕ2P˙RODi,t−1 + ϕ3IRi,t−1 + εi,t (21)
The introduction of institutional variables as a determinant of OECD unemployment gener-
ally leads to fragile econometric results. The significance of institutions and the sign of their
impact is highly sensitive to changes in specification. Whereas the results are often significant
when institutions are tested separately, the impact of institutions generally disappear if extra
instutional varibles are incorporated. This is partly due to collinearty between some of these
variables. Moreover, the R2 does not improve much, compared to the benchmark model based
exclusively on shocks. Testing simultaneously several institutions and several of their poten-
tial impacts (on the intercept, on the persistence and on the sensitivity to shock) provides poor
results whose the interpretation is difficult.
As a consequence, we followed a two-stage estimation procedure. Firstly, we tested each
institution separately in (20) in order to select the significant variables and to assess if their
impact is consistent with economic theory (Section 6.1). Secondly, we tested the institutional
variables which turned out to be significant simultaneously in order to evaluate their robustness
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to changes in specification (Section 6.2). Comparing the statistical properties of alternative
specifications allows us to select the best model including the greatest number of institutional
variables. Finally, Section 6.3 tests if this model reduces significatively fixed-effect heterogene-
ity.
6.1 Testing institutions separately
Results obtained when each institutional variable is separately tested are summarised in the
next three tables. Every time, the three potential impacts of a given institution are tested on the
level of unemployement (i.e. on the intercept), on its persistence and on its sensitivity to shocks.
But only significant regressors are displayed in the following tables.
Table 5 presents the estimation of the effects of active labour market policy (ALMP) spend-
ings as a percentage of GDP (almp) or as a percentage of GDP normalized by the unemploy-
ment rate (almp−unem), as well as the effects of employment protection (epl).
Table 5 : Introduction of institutional variables
Ut almp almp−unem epl
Cst −0, 931∗∗∗ 0.368∗ 1.562∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ α¯
Ut−1 0.895∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ λ0
Shocks 0.055∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ θ0
P˙Ct − P˙Ct−1 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ ϕ0
P˙Mt−1 − P˙Ct−1 0.005 0.005 ϕ1
P˙RODt−1 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ ϕ2
IRt−1 0.081
∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ ϕ3
Inst. 1.370∗∗∗ α1
Inst. ∗ Ut−1 0.079∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ λ1
Inst. ∗ Shocks −0.001∗ −0.095∗∗∗ θ1
R2 0.957 0.952 0.962
Obs. 372 372 352 766
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When the three potential effects of almp are tested simultaneously, the coefficient related to
the variable Inst. ∗ Shocks is not significant. Besides, positive impact of almp on unemploy-
ment persistence is not robust, since almp would decrease persistence when tested simultane-
ously with the effect on the unemployment rate. The latter is the only robust effect to changes
in specification, with a positive signe. This surprising result, which is not in accordance with
standard economic theory, may come from the strong endogeneity of ALMP spendings to un-
employment. Indeed, the higher the uneployment rate, the higher the ALMP spendings, rather
than the opposite.
This counterintuitive result comes all the more from an endogeneity bias as the conclusions
are radically modified when the ALMP spendings are normalized by the unemployment rate
(almp−unem). The coefficient of the latter variable has a significant and negative signe on
unemployment persistence and on its sensitivity to shocks. This specification, whose the results
are more coherent with standard wisdom, seems to rule out the endogeneity problem.
The impact of employment protection (epl) is positive on unemployment persistence and
negative on the sensitivity to shocks whereas the effect on the unemployment level is not sig-
nificant. The results are consistent with standard economic theory. Employment protection has
a cycle-smoothing effect which make the unemployment rate less sensitive to shocks. At the
same time, it leads to higher inertia that may increase structural unemployment.
The impact of the unemployment benefit duration (bd) is not significant on the unemploy-
ment level, but it is negative on its persistence and positive on the sensitivity to shocks (Table 6).
The fact that an increase in the benefit duration lowerpersistence of the unemployment rate is at
odds with standard labour supply theoretical models. However, one possible beneficial effect of
long benefit duration for unemployment persistence is that it prevents from skills deterioration
by leaving the time to find the appropriate job. But by providing more time for job search, the
impact of a given shock is more harmful for contemporary unemployement.
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Table 6 : Introduction of institutional variables
Ut bd brr1 udnet−vis
Cst 0.092 0.13 0.06 α¯
Ut−1 0.981∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ λ0
Shocks 0.052∗∗∗ θ0
P˙Ct − P˙Ct−1 −0.047∗∗∗ −0.058∗ ϕ0
P˙Mt−1 − P˙Ct−1 0.007 0.008∗ ϕ1
P˙RODt−1 −0.096∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ ϕ2
IRt−1 0.091
∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ ϕ3
Inst. α1
Inst. ∗ Ut−1 −0.149∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.00007∗ λ1
Inst. ∗ Shocks 0.080∗∗∗ θ1
R2 0.961 0.960 0.960
Obs. 764 764 720
The impacts of the unemployement replacement rate (brr1) and of the trade union member-
ship density (udnet−vis) on the unemployment persistence are significant and positive. This
result is consistent with some theoretical predictions. A high replacement rate may disincenti-
vate return to employment whereas in a non-cooperative trade union context, a strong bargain-
ing power may enhance insider wages to the detriment of hiring outsiders. Besides, these two
variables have no significant impact neither on the unemployment level nor on its sensitivity to
shocks.
Finally, the impacts of coordination (cow) and of the centralisation level (cew−int) of wage
negotiation, of the education level (educ−int) and of the labour tax rate (t1) have been tested in
the Table 7.
31
Table 7 : Introduction of institutional variables
Ut (cew−int− 2)2 (cow − 2)2 t1 educ−int(−5)
Cte 0.033 0.098 0.181 0.130 0.151 0.032 α¯
Ut−1 0.911∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ λ0
Shocks 0.084∗∗∗ 0.019 θ0
P˙Ct − P˙Ct−1 −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ ϕ0
P˙Mt−1 − P˙Ct−1 0.008∗ 0.008 0.009∗ 0.008 ϕ1
P˙RODt−1 −0.099∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ ϕ2
IRt−1 0.088
∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ ϕ3
Inst. −0.204∗∗ α1
Inst. ∗ Ut−1 −0.031∗∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.007∗∗ λ1
Inst. ∗ Shocks 0.023∗ 0.010∗∗∗ θ1
R2 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.962 0.959 0.959
Obs. 779 779 779 697 754 754
The first two variables correspond to a wage negotiation index of coordination and central-
isation: cow and cew−int. These variables take five possible values: 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3,
a high value corresponding to high centralisation, and a low value corresponding to negotia-
tion at the company scale. According to the theory, extreme values of centralisation induce
more efficiency in terms of employment, for several reasons. A strongly decentralised negoti-
ation allows automatic adjustments to the cyclical situation of firms. On the contrary, highly
centralised negotiations provide higher incentives to employers and trade unions to take into
account macroeconomic equilibrium matters. The intermediate situation provides unions with
negotiation power, excluding quick adjustments to the cycle, and does not encourage firms and
employees to take into account the macroeconomic context during the negotiations. The two
variables cow and cew−int have been added in the regression, either directly, or as a function of
the distance to the central value (2). Tested linearly, the two variables have no significant effect
on unemployment through neither of the three potential effects. On the contrary, (cew−int−2)2
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and (cow− 2)2 have a significative impact respectively on sensitivity to shocks and persistence
of unemployment. The effect of (cow − 2)2 is consistent with the theory whereas the one of
(cew−int − 2)2, whose effect on sensitivity to shocks is negative, is not. However, the latter
effect is only significant at the 10 % level.
Besides, education has no immediate effect on unemployment. However, the education
variable introduced with a five years lag has an effect on the unemployment persistence and
on the sensitivity to shocks. A better educated labour force reduces unemployment persistence
by improving its opportunity in job search. The positive effect on the sensitivity to shocks
is more difficult to interpret from a theoretical point of view. Moreover, as the introduction
of this variable strongly modifies the other coefficients of the model, we fear the existence of
collinearity problem.
Finally, the level of the labour tax rate is positively correlated to unemployment persistence,
whereas no effect on the intercept and on the sensitivity to shock is found. This result is often
interpreted as a validation of the standard neoclassical view, where any increase in labour costs
discourages firms from hiring. However, one should be cautious in judging the beneficial effect
for employment of tax cuts based on this econometric results. Indeed, it should not be forgot-
ten that econometric techniques indentify correlation but do not say anything on the direction
of causality. Hence, another quite plausible interpretation is that persistent unemployment in
OECD obliged economic authorites to increase taxes in order to equilibrate public accounts.
6.2 Testing institutions simultaneously
In this section, the robustness of the significant variables is tested by regressing them simul-
taneously in the unemployment equation. The variables almp and almp−unem are not tested
because the lack of observations prevents the correct comparison of the different models. Vari-
ables producing an impact on unemployment persistence and on the sensitivity to shocks are
successively tested.
On the unemployment persistence: The seven variables impacting the unemployment per-
sistence (brr1, (cow−2)2, bd, educ−int(−5), t1, udnet−vis and epl) are tested simultaneously
two by two. Each effect is compared against the 6 others, leading to the following results :
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• bd : 3 times negative, 3 times insignificant
• brr1 : 5 times positive, once insignificant
• (cow − 2)2 : 3 times negative, 3 times insignificant
• educ−int(−5) : 6 times insignificant
• t1 : 6 times positive
• udnet−vis : 6 times positive
• epl : 6 times insignificant
Therefore the three most robust variables are brr1, t1 and udnet−vis. Tested together, all
coefficients associated to these variables remain significant, except for brr1. Hence, we finally
select two variables: t1 and udnet−vis.
On the unemployment sensitivity to shocks: Testing two by two the four variable having an
effect on the sensitivity to shocks (bd, (cew−int − 2)2, epl, educ−int) leads to the following
results:
• bd : once positive, 2 times insignificant
• (cow − 2)2 : once positive, 2 times insignificant
• epl : 3 times negative
The only robust variable is employment protection, which decreases unemployment sensi-
tivity to shocks.
Simultaneous evaluation of robustness: When tested simultaneously, the three previously
selected variables remain significant, with the same sign for the estimated coefficient. Hence,
the equation including the greatest number of institutional variables is:
Ui,t = αi + (λ0 + λ1t1i,t + λ2udnet−visi,t)Ui,t−1 + (θ0 + θ1epli,t)Shocksi,t−1 + εi,t (22)
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The associated coefficients are :
Table 11: Results of the regressions
t1
Ut udnet−vis
epl
Intercept α¯ 0.012
Ut−1 λ0 0.789∗∗∗
Ut−1 ∗ t1 λ1 0.0041∗∗∗
Ut−1 ∗ udnet− vis λ2 0.0006∗
Shocks θ0 0.177
∗∗∗
Shocks ∗ epl θ1 −0.102∗∗∗
R2 0.962
Number of obs. 653
This result is econometrically robust and consistent with the standard neoclassical view,
since the tax rate and union density would increase unemployment persistence, whereas em-
ployment protection would reduce its sensitivity to shocks. It also allows a decomposition of
changes in unemployment into a shock effect and into an institutional effect (see Appendix
C). However, the R2, which equals to 0.962, is hardly greater than the one in the regression
including only shock variables (0.961, Table 2). The introduction of institutional variables is
thus quite desappointing since it carries little additional information (from a statistical point
of view) compared to the previous explanation of OECD unemployment based exclusively on
shocks. Moreover, we fear the existence of endogeneity of institutions in particular in the case
of the tax rate effect.
6.3 Institutions and heterogeneity
The introduction of fixed effects in Section 5.2 showed institutional heterogeneity in the unem-
ployment level, in its persistence and in its sensitivity to shocks. We want to test whether the
introduction of institutional variables reduces this heterogeneity. In other words, we test if insti-
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tutional variables provide a proper explanation of heterogeneity in unemployement persistence
and in the sensitivity to shocks.
In the final model retained, no institution has a significative influence on the unemployment
level. Therefore, after taking into account of institutions, we test remaining heterogeneity in
Equation (22) only on unemployment persistence and on the sensitivity to shocks:
Test 1 : Persistence, H0 : λ0 = λ0,i
Uˆi,t = αˆi +
(
λˆ0,i + λˆ1t1i,t + λˆ2udnet−visi,t
)
Ui,t−1 +
(
θˆ0 + θˆ1epli,t
)
Shocksi,t−1
Test 2 : Sensitivity to shocks, H0 : θ0 = θ0,i
Uˆi,t = αˆi +
(
λˆ0 + λˆ1t1i,t + λˆ2udnet−visi,t
)
Ui,t−1 +
(
θˆ0,i + θˆ1epli,t
)
Shocksi,t−1
Table 9 :Tests
Test 1 : Persistence Test 2 : Sensitivity
λˆ0,i=1 = ... = λˆ0,i=20 = λˆ0 θˆ0,i=1 = ... = θˆ0,i=20 = θˆ0
F-stat 1.00 4.19
Pvalue 0.46 0.00
The Fisher test accepts the null hypothesis of homogeneity on the persistence coefficient but
it rejects it for the coefficient of the sensitivity to shocks. Hence, the selected institutions explain
adequately the statistical heterogeneity in unemployment persistence accross OECD countries
but not heterogeneity in the sensitivity to shocks.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a theoritical and empirical appraisal of the shocks-institutions controverse
as an explanation of unemployment heterogeneity in OECD countries. Based on this work,
our answer to the question asked in the title of this paper is negative: the interaction be-
tween shocks and institutions does not explain exhaustively the OECD unemployment puzzle.
Whereas shocks provide a satisfactory explanation to fluctuations in unemployment, the usual
institutional variables present a rather desappointing empirical result. Their statistical influence
on unemployment is not robust to change in specifications. Some collinearity problems ham-
per the construction of a robust model including a wide range of institutions. The statistical
36
improvement realised upon introduction of institutions is rather modest and endogeneity issues
make the interpretation of the correlation between institutions and unemployment quite tricky.
In terms of economic policy implications, our results suggests that the mainstream economic
view puts too much emphasis on the beneficial effect of structural reforms which deal with the
microeconomic determinants of unemployment to the detriment of the role of macroeconomic
governance.
Finally, this paper tried to propos a rigorous theoretical framework allowing for a better
identification of the interaction between shocks and labour market institutions. It showed that a
shocks-institution interpretation is possible without including institutional variables, since co-
efficients estimates express nothing else but institutions. The fact that they summarise a wide
range of heterogeneous institutional characteristics may explain why the inclusion of institu-
tional variables gives disappointing empirical results. The available institutional variables may
be a poor proxy for the reality. Some of these variables are not always available over a long
period. Some are not directly observable at a macroeconomic level or are at least very difficult
to ascertain reliably (e.g. the reservation wage, the bargaining strength of workers, the value of
leisure). Some others are even impossible to measure (e.g. the flexibility of the labour market).
A further investigation could consist in appraising the impact of these "unobservable variables"
by testing on panel data stochastic variations in coefficients with a random coefficient (or un-
observable component) econometric method such as the Kalman filter approach, as initiated by
the Time-Varying NAIRU literature (e.g. Heyer et al., 2007).
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Appendix
i
A Glossary
We used OECD data. Institutional data have been compiled by William Nickell 12, whereas
economic series come directly from the OECD Economic Outlook database. Most of the insti-
tutional data have been interpolated from their last known value until 2006 in order to increase
the number of observations. This is a fairly good approximation since institutionnal series are
general quite stable over time.
A.1 Labour market institutions data
• almp : Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies as a percentage of the GDP.
• almp−unem : Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies as a percentage of the GDP
divided by the Unemployment Rate.
• bd : Benefit duration index, constructed from replacement rates from first to fifth year of
benefit.
• brr1 : Gross unemployment benefit replacement rate.
• cew−int : Index of bargaining centralization, between 1 (plant level) and 3 (Central level).
• cow : Index of bargaining coordination between 1 (Uncoordinated) and 3 (strong coordi-
nation).
• educ−int : Educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over expressed as
average years of schooling
• epl : Employment protection measured as the strictness of employment protection legis-
lation.
• hpy : Average actual annual hours worked per person in employment.
12Nickell W. (2006), " The CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004) ", CEP Discussion Papers 759,
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/data0730.zip.
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• t1 : Labour tax rate, defined as the ratio between the employer’s sociale security contri-
bution and gross employees’ wages.
• uc : Union coverage refers to the number of workers covered by collective agreements
normalised on employment.
• udnet−vis : Trade union density.
A.2 Other data
• IN : Long-term interest rate (10-years)
• IR = IN − P˙C : Real interest rate
• N : Total (dependent and self) employment
• PC : Consumer price deflator
• PM : Import price (imports of goods and services deflator)
• PROD = Y/N : labour productivity
• P V : Price of value-added (GDP price deflator)
• TC : Employer social contribution rate
• TCU : Capacity-utilisation ratio
• T I : Direct and indirect tax rate
• U : Standardised unemployment rate (ILO guidelines)
• W : Wage
• Y : Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices
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B : Comparingmethodologies used for estimating the impact
of shocks
Method 1 : The shock variable is constructed as :
Shocksi,t−1 =
ϕˆ0
ϕˆ3
(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1) +
ϕˆ1
ϕˆ3
(P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) +
ϕˆ2
ϕˆ3
P˙RODi,t−1 + I
R
i,t−1
With ϕˆ0 = -0.048 ϕˆ2 = -0.101
ϕˆ1 = 0.007 ϕˆ3 = 0.088
Method 2 : The variable Shocks is an estimated variable Sˆhocks. In order to obtain the good
standard errors of the coefficient of the shocks variable, we made simultaneous estimation of a
system with 40 equations :
Ui,t = α′1i + λUi,t−1 + ϕ0(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕ1(P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) + ϕ2P˙RODi,t−1 + ϕ3IRi,t−1 + i,t
and
Ui,t = α′′i + λUi,t−1 + θi
[
ϕ0
ϕ3
(P˙Ci,t − P˙Ci,t−1) +
ϕ1
ϕ3
(P˙Mi,t−1 − P˙Ci,t−1) +
ϕ2
ϕ3
P˙RODi,t−1 + I
R
i,t−1
]
+ εi,t
Results are given in the following table :
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Table 10: Comparaison
Method 1 Method 2
Pays θi std err θi std err
Australia 0.121 0.031 0.094 0.031
Austria 0.051 0.043 0.009 0.031
Belgium 0.13 0.033 0.092 0.031
Canada 0.155 0.033 0.092 0.031
Denmark 0.061 0.020 0.074 0.031
Finland 0.211 0.031 0.036 0.031
France 0.086 0.031 0.051 0.031
Germany 0.17 0.059 0.039 0.031
Ireland 0.188 0.027 0.202 0.032
Italy 0.041 0.018 0.042 0.022
Japan 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.033
Netherland 0.111 0.033 0.133 0.043
New-Zealand 0.059 0.029 0.102 0.031
Norway 0.09 0.025 0.063 0.035
Portugal 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.018
Spain 0.227 0.028 0.189 0.032
Sweden 0.04 0.027 0.045 0.032
Suisse 0.124 0.043 0.003 0.031
United Kingdom 0.165 0.027 0.134 0.031
United States 0.128 0.030 0.132 0.036
Mean 0.030 0.031
Standard errors obtained using the second methodology vary less than those obtained using
the first one. Their mean values, however, are similar. The construction of the shock variable
used in the first methodology implies a higher volatility of standard errors but no higher volatil-
ity of coefficients. Even if some coefficients differ between the two methodologies, the same
countries turn out to be significant with only three exceptions. Therefore, we chose to present
the simplest methodology (the first one). The above mentioned check of the two methodologies
has been carried out for each result presented in this paper.
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C : Variance analysis, contribution of shocks and institutions
to model relevance
C.1 Concept and models
It is possible to carry out this analysis further in order to quantify the impact of the introduc-
tion of institutional variables and of their interactions with shocks, for each regression, on the
theoretical model proposed.
The idea is to construct, for each regression, two "synthetic" variables Uˆ and Uˆ I , and to
compare them with the observed series U . Uˆ I represents the estimated unemployment, in which
some significant institutions are added. Uˆ corresponds to the unemployment variable built using
variables of shocks, with estimated βh coefficients for the same equation:
Uˆ Ii,t =
∑
h
βˆhxh,i,t +
∑
j
[
λˆjInstj,t ∗ Ui,t−1
]
+
∑
k
[
θˆkInstk,t ∗ Shocksi,t
]
(23)
where xh represents the shocks, λˆj represents the estimated effects of institutional variables
j on unemployment persistence, θˆk the estimated effects of institutional variables k on the sen-
sitivity of unemployment to shocks and βh the estimated effects of shocks. According to this,
one can write Uˆi,t as:
Uˆi,t =
∑
h
xh,i,tβˆh (24)
C.2 The regressions and their results
Basing upon our results on the robustness of institutional variables, we consider on the one
hand the epl variable, which has a significant effect on unemployment persistence and on its
reaction to shocks, and on the other hand, in a simultaneous regression, the t1 and udnet−vis
variables, which have a significant impact on unemployment persistence, and the epl variable
used in interaction with shocks.
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The following table gives the results obtained for the estimations of Uˆi,t and Uˆ Ii,t.
Table 11: Results of the regressions
t1
Ut epl udnet−vis
epl
Intercept −0.008∗∗∗ 0.012
Ut−1 0.829∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
Shocks 0.171∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
Ut−1 ∗ epl 0.104∗∗∗
shocks ∗ epl −0.095∗∗∗
Ut−1 ∗ t1 0.0041∗∗∗
shocks ∗ epl −0.102∗∗∗
Ut−1 ∗ udnet− vis 0.0006∗
R2 0.962 0.962
Number of obs. 766 653
We can now compare the estimations obtained with and without the introduction of institu-
tional variables, and have an idea of the information provided by the inclusion of these variables.
C.2.1 Contribution of employment protection in explaining unemployment
Below, we present the results of both regressions for six countries (France, Portugal, United
Kingdom, United States, Norway and Sweden). We draw the three unemployment curves cor-
responding to the three definitions of unemployment, Uˆ , Uˆ I and U . The bold curves correspond
to the observed series. In dotted lines, we have represented the Uˆ series, and in fine lines, the
Uˆ I series.
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Results of the first regression (epl)
According to this graph, employment protection and its interaction with shocks provide a
marginal contribution in explaining unemployment in France and Portugal; this contribution is
almost nil in the United States and the United Kingdom, but it is substantial in Sweden and
Norway.
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C.2.2 Joint contribution of employment protection, tax rates and union density in ex-
plaining unemployment
Results of the second regression (t1, udnet−vis, epl)
Institutions play a more important role than in the first regression, since the Uˆ I curve is much
closer of U than in the first estimation. It is the case for France (which has one of the highest
tax and social contribution rates within the OECD), and Portugal, but also and above all, it is
the case for the United Kingdom and the United States, where the two curves Uˆ I and Uˆ do not
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match any longer.
The situation is almost identical to that of the first regression for Norway, but it is not totally
the case for Sweden; the latter has the highest union density13 in the OECD during the 1960-
1998 period (this figure is between 50% and 55% or Norway) and extremely high tax and social
contribution rates: it is therefore logical that these institutions allow a better explanation of
unemployment rates in this country.
However, this variance analysis reinforces the intuitions we can have when we observe the
irregularity of our results. Unemployment dynamics are mainly explained by economic shocks
while the role of institutions in this evolution turns out to be minor.
13This rate is about 64% for the 1960-1964 period, 83% for the 1980-1997 period, and 87% for the 1996-1998
period.
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C.3 : The analysis of variance: overall outlook
Contribution of employment protection in explaining unemployment
Results of the first regression (epl)
The graphs suggest two main conclusions.
Firstly, they show the increasing trend in unemployment in OECD countries during the 1960-
1997 period, with a continuous and progressive rise in Canada, France, Italy and New-Zealand,
a strong growth during the second half of 1970s in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Switzer-
land, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Denmark, Great-Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and
Japan. Some countries have experienced a second increase in the unemployment rate during
the first half of 1980s (Germany, Denmark, Great-Britain, the Netherlands), whereas scandi-
navian countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden) really experienced unemployment only from the
beginning of 1990s (with a slight increase at the beginning of 1980s for Norway and Sweden).
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Ireland experienced a progressive rise of unemployment during the 1980s, with a peak in 1987,
whereas in the USA, strong fluctuations appear, with a peak during the first half of 1980s.
The only countries whose institutions seem to partly explain unemployment are Portugal,
Denmark, Norway and Sweden (until the 1990s for the last three), Spain (from the middle of
1980s), Italy, Japan and France. This is not the case neither in Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia,
New-Zealand, Ireland, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom) nor in Belgium,
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and, more surprising, Finland.
Joint contribution of employment protection, the tax rate and union density in explaining
unemployment
Results of the second regression (t1, udnet− vis, epl)
The role of institutions seems to vary, not only across countries, but also and specially with
time.
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• The inclusion of institutions in the regression provides a significant additional explana-
tion, for countries like Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. Insti-
tutions do not improve the quality of the estimation in the case of Australia, Austria,
Germany, Switzerland, Japan and New-Zealand. For the rest of the countries, (Canada,
Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the USA), the
situation est intermediate : the additional explanation of institutions is present, but lim-
ited.
• The first strong increase in unemployment discussed above takes place, for most coun-
tries, in the second half of the 1970s ; it may explain why institutions begin to play a role
as explicative variables on differences among countries at the beginning of the following
decade : indeed, the synthetic variable Uˆ I is particularly close to the effective unemploy-
ment rate during the second half of the estimated period (1960-1997).
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